WASHINGTON/TOKYO — On Wednesday, Fumio Kishida is scheduled to spend his 920th day as Japan’s Prime Minister meeting U.S. President Joe Biden at the White House. Since 1945 only seven of Kishida’s predecessors have made it to 1,000 days in office, and he is determined to become the eighth.

“I have no plans to dissolve parliament right now,” he said, quickly dismissing rumors of an early general election during an interview with Nikkei Asia ahead of his historic trip to Washington, D.C. The tumult of the U.S. election season awaits him there, with Biden and Donald Trump in a dead heat to win the presidential election in November.

But Kishida clearly has an eye on his own political challenges, amid speculation that he might send Japan to the polls before the current parliamentary session ends on June 23, six days before his 1,000th day on the job. Despite months of low approval ratings, fueled by a relentless political funding scandal, Japan’s 100th prime minister is confident that, “after two years of my new capitalism policy, Japan is finally seeing the light at the end of the tunnel.”

Kishida has reason to be optimistic. Following three decades of deflation and stagnant economic growth, the first quarter of 2024 has seen Japan’s stock market soar to record highs, union workers enjoy their biggest wage hikes in 33 years and the Bank of Japan reverse its decadeslong negative rate policy. And when asked what he hopes his legacy in Japan will be after 1,000 days at the top, Kishida is quick to answer: “the economy.”

On the world stage, however, Kishida will be remembered for something quite different: “A drastic reinforcement of our defense capabilities,” as he puts it, alongside a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance.

Kishida undertakes his four-day trip to Washington D.C. — the first state-level visit to the U.S. by a Japanese prime minister in nine years — armed with his government’s recent approval of a record 7.95 trillion yen ($55 billion) defense budget for the financial year through next March. Biden will host a state dinner for Kishida, and on Thursday, the prime minister has been invited to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress, making him the first Japanese leader to do so since the late Shinzo Abe in 2015.

At the White House, Kishida will note that recent events have shown globalization and interdependence alone cannot serve as a guarantor for peace in the world, and that Japan is now ready to act as America’s “global partner.”

“I want to stress that Japan and the U.S. are global partners in maintaining and strengthening the rules-based, free and open international order,” Kishida told Nikkei. “We will also bolster our defense and national security cooperation.”

But keeping the U.S. committed to Japan’s security is not as easy as it has been in the past, as the American public signals fatigue with the country’s many foreign commitments.

Republican candidate Trump has made clear, throughout his first term and during his ongoing presidential campaign, that America’s allies are “not carrying their fair share of the burden,” said John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser. The former president indicated toward the end of his first administration that he believed Japan and South Korea were not paying adequate host-nation support. “He saw it simply as a real estate deal,” Bolton told Nikkei. “In effect, he was saying, ‘Well, we’re defending Japan. Therefore, you ought to pay more.'”

While the probability of the U.S. coming to Japan’s aid in a time of crisis remains very high, “Japan should not take this for granted, even if the president is not Mr. Trump,” wrote Ryozo Kato, a retired diplomat and postwar Japan’s longest-serving ambassador to the U.S., in a recent column for Nikkei.

This risk has not escaped Kishida. Since becoming prime minister in October 2021, he has put security at the forefront of his agenda, surprising many overseas and at home with new, muscular policies.

In 2022, Kishida published a new national security policy that has aligned Japan’s defense strategy with that of the U.S. and pledged to nearly double its defense-related spending to 2% of gross domestic product by 2027 — a key threshold designed to silence critics, like Trump, who call U.S. allies free riders. Most recently, Kishida’s government has also widened Japan’s long-restricted path to exporting weapons.

In the Indo-Pacific, Japan under Kishida has taken historic steps toward acquiring long-range missiles capable of conducting counterstrikes against potential adversaries such as China or North Korea. The prime minister has rebuilt historically tense relations with neighbor South Korea, too, and strengthened ties across Southeast Asia. During this week’s trip, Kishida will take part in a trilateral summit with Biden and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to warn Beijing against aggression in the South China Sea.

Against a backdrop of increasing hostility from China and Russia, and following decades of wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Ukraine and Gaza, Kishida’s proactive approach to defense is being welcomed in Washington. “The past two years have been, for Japan, probably the most momentous two years since World War II,” U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel told national security adviser Jake Sullivan in a March meeting.

Kishida has “upended policies that have been around for 70 years,” such as Japan’s strict restrictions on weapons exports, limited defense spending and historically icy relations with Seoul, Emanuel added.

Team effort

Kishida’s “global partnership” rhetoric, alongside regional diplomacy with South Korea and the Philippines, appears aimed at aligning Japan’s interests with the U.S. in a way that Prime Minister Abe never did. Abe was the last Japanese prime minister to undertake a state-level visit to the White House, in April 2015, and the main architect of Japan’s foreign policy for the past decade.

Under a “new phase” for world security, underlined by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war in Gaza, and attempts by China to change the status quo in the South and East China Seas, Japan must “adopt a more responsible stance within the international community,” Kishida told Nikkei.

Kishida’s decisive approach to foreign policy has been a surprise for many in Washington. The prime minister, who spent three years of his childhood living in Queens, New York, was largely expected to be a foreign policy dove. Instead, he has continued on the assertive diplomatic path Abe had laid out, and even accelerated it in unexpected ways.

Abe had actively negotiated with China and Russia to strengthen Japan’s position. Kishida, on the other hand, has emphasized building a coalition against Moscow and Beijing, who envision forming a new international order.

“Traveling around Southeast Asia, I’ve felt that countries want options,” Kishida said. “A lack of options, in terms of both security and diplomacy, is not welcome.” In the face of growing economic and diplomatic Chinese influence across the region, “it is natural for Japan to be expected to become a powerful alternative, economically and in other areas,” he added.

The difference in Abe and Kishida’s approaches is perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the leaders’ handling of Russia. During his almost 10 years in office, Abe met Russian President Vladimir Putin 27 times. The Japanese leader was aiming to avoid a three-front crisis, in which Japan would have to face China, North Korea and Russia simultaneously, and hoped that proactively reaching out to Moscow would ensure Putin thought twice before teaming up with Beijing.

In stark contrast, Kishida has met Putin zero times since becoming prime minister in October 2021. In line with the West, he was quick to denounce Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, joining in sanctions against Russia and instantly burning any bridges with Moscow that Abe had built.

“In general, the fundamental principle that seems to guide Kishida’s foreign policy is that the rules-based international order is threatened in ways that it wasn’t when Abe was in power, which requires a different set of priorities,” said Tobias Harris, an analyst of Japanese politics and author of Abe’s biography, “The Iconoclast: Shinzo Abe and the New Japan.”

Kishida has been similarly steadfast in his approach to China, which is bound to be a central topic in his discussions with Biden this week. The prime minister will sell Japan as an indispensable, active partner for the U.S. in the region, against the “reality of an increasing Chinese presence” in the Indo-Pacific.

“Of course, we would like the U.S. to remain involved in the region,” Kishida told Nikkei, but “Japan is also required to enhance its presence as a prominent option for Asian countries.”

A key hurdle to U.S.-Japan defense integration thus far has been Tokyo’s strict interpretation of its pacifist constitution. For years, Japan had defined the U.S.-Japan alliance as a “spear and shield,” with Tokyo as the shield, focused on defending its own territory. Under Abe, Japan took steps to alter this, allowing Tokyo to deploy its Self-Defense Forces to other countries if Japan’s survival was threatened.

Under Kishida, Japan is moving toward even greater offensive capabilities, such as signing a contract in January to acquire 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles from the U.S.

One of the highlights of the Biden-Kishida summit is slated to be a new commitment to integrate the country’s defense industrial bases. The poster child of this new initiative will be the U.S. Navy beginning to use Japanese private shipyards to repair its warships. But the integration of the countries’ defense industrial bases will not stop there — the leaders are also expected to announce the launch of a working group to discuss co-development and potential co-production of munitions, planes and ships.

The idea is to face the rise of China together, experts say. “We need to grow the pie and share the pie,” former U.S. Defense Department official Scott Harold told Nikkei.

Economic ties: “A win-win situation”

But the fate of Kishida’s ambitious plans for further Japan-U.S. integration will be determined not in the White House this week but at the ballot box in November.

A Trump win could threaten Kishida’s plans for both security and trade. Trump has become a lightning rod for “America First” rhetoric, promoting protectionist trade policies and skepticism toward international alliances throughout his presidential campaign.

During his time in office, “Trump was very openly skeptical of the value of [the U.S.-Japan alliance], and certainly has a different outlook on the international rules-based order and international institutions — all the things that Japan has really embraced,” said Emma Chanlett-Avery, the director for political-security affairs at the Asia Society Policy Institute who spent 20 years at the Congressional Research Service observing Japan.

In his 30-minute interview with Nikkei on April 4, Kishida did not refer to Biden or Trump by name. Showing Japan is committed to the U.S.-Japan alliance will be the best assurance that the relationship stays strong regardless of how the November election swings, Japanese diplomats say.

To this end, Kishida on Thursday will address a joint session of the U.S. Congress. A senior Foreign Ministry official explained that Japan’s insistence on delivering a speech to Congress, rather than just talking with Biden and his Democrats, was based on a desire to emphasize that the U.S.-Japan alliance transcends party politics and enjoys bipartisan support.

No matter who comes out on top in November, Japan sees itself as carrying the banner of free trade. “We have established a win-win situation for Japan-U.S. economic relations, but this relationship needs to be further enriched moving forward,” Kishida told Nikkei. To do this, “we must strengthen and maintain the free and open rules-based economic order.”

Achieving this goal would be challenging under another Trump presidency. In one of his first acts as president, Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact. Since then, the U.S. has pursued an increasingly isolationist trade policy, focusing on attracting investment back home, sometimes at the expense of allies like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Biden’s decision last March to limit electric vehicle tax breaks to cars assembled in North America was a particular blow.

The latest trade friction is over Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel, and U.S. union workers’ opposition to the deal.

Kishida said that a dispute over Nippon Steel’s proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel will not be on the agenda when he meets with Biden, as it is “a matter for private companies.” But, he added: “Japan is the biggest investor in the United States and is responsible for a significant portion of U.S. employment.”

Nippon Steel in December agreed to buy U.S. Steel for $14 billion, but the outlook for the deal is now clouded by Biden’s opposition. Trump has also promised to block the deal if elected.

While Nippon Steel is eager to close the transaction before the election, that possibility remains “unclear,” said Atsushi Yamaguchi, a senior analyst at SMBC Nikko Securities. Suppose the deal is closed after the election, and Trump wins. In that case, the prospect of getting a presidential sign-off will be “more uncertain,” particularly as “Japan currently does not have a [leader] trusted deeply by Trump, like Shinzo Abe,” to navigate the negotiations, Yamaguchi told Nikkei.

Trump: Handle with care

Kishida’s meeting with Biden on Wednesday will also be a vital chance to coordinate policies on a country that is at once Japan’s most volatile threat and a diplomatic opportunity, North Korea. A visit to Pyongyang to resolve

the longstanding issue of North Korea’s historic abductions of Japanese citizens would be a significant foreign policy victory for Kishida.

“I would like to exchange views [with Biden] at the summit, and work closely together with the U.S. under the common understanding that a path to talks with North Korea will open,” Kishida told Nikkei.

Kishida emphasized that, although no meeting with Kim Jong Un has been confirmed, resolving the many flashpoints that lie between Tokyo and Pyongyang would not only benefit the two neighbors but contribute to the peace and stability of the region. “That is why I have been stating that a top meeting is important,” the prime minister said.

The Biden administration has been reluctant to engage in any active diplomacy with North Korea, with the president leaving any mention of the country out of his maiden foreign policy address in 2021.

As the election nears, Biden’s disinterest in meeting with North Korea’s leader appears rooted in a desire to highlight the failings of Trump’s earlier attempts to reach out to Kim.

Trump met Kim thrice during his time as president, in Singapore, Hanoi and briefly at the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea. The 2019 Hanoi meeting hit a dead end as there was no clear indication that North Korea had made a strategic decision to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons, said Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser.

According to Bolton, the then-president offered Kim a ride on Air Force One to take him back to Pyongyang, but Kim declined. “Kim Jong Un will be one of the first people to call Trump if he’s reelected. This time Trump will go to Pyongyang,” Bolton told Nikkei.

But experts warn that a Trump victory would bring more risks than benefits for Kishida when it comes to North Korea. Fueled by a desire to become the first U.S. president to visit Pyongyang and strike a deal with Kim, Trump may one day lower the threshold for an agreement, which would alter the region’s geopolitical landscape, Bolton said.

Bolton’s advice to Kishida and President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea, in the case of a Trump victory, “is to get to the U.S. as soon as you can and not to waste any time in following Prime Minister Abe’s model of being in constant touch with Trump.”

But Harris, Abe’s biographer, said that by 2018 or 2019, even Abe’s ability to get Trump to listen was declining.

“Trump was starting to reach out to North Korea, and Abe was like, ‘Let’s meet, let’s have a call,’ to constantly remind Trump not to forget Japan. I don’t think Trump cared at all,” Harris told Nikkei. “The idea that you are going to be able to flatter your way through, I don’t think that’s going to work anymore.”

Masafumi Ishii, a former Japanese ambassador to Indonesia and a diplomat with experience preparing for a new American administration during his stints in Washington, told a seminar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in February that the key to dealing with Trump is to ride the tide.

“Never go against the tide,” Ishii said, because such an effort typically does not work.

Instead, Ishii proposes a “latticework” strategy to deal with Trump. Pointing to Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia, he said, “Together we should be prepared to survive Trump 2.0.”

The task for these countries is to “create” a tide, such as highlighting the importance of defending Taiwan, Ishii said. He suggested a joint, legal, influence campaign by relevant embassies in Washington, to nudge Trump into making policy decisions in line with the trend.

The consequences of being complacent could be more than many think, he suggested. “Though China, Taiwan nor the United States would like to have a military confrontation over Taiwan now,” Ishii said, “there are two cases where China is likely to start.”

The first is Taiwan declaring independence. The more troubling is the second, Ishii said. “If it becomes clear that the U.S. does not intend to defend Taiwan at a time of crisis, the temptation on the part of China would be too big to resist.

“My feeling is that Trump may make this second case happen, even without realizing it.”

Additional reporting by Sayumi Take and Hiroyuki Akiyama.